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Abstract 
The search for universal processes associated with symptom change across emotional 
disorders and different forms of psychotherapy offers hope of increased theoretical 
parsimony and treatment efficiencies. This study investigated whether intolerance of 
uncertainty (IU) is a universal process by examining whether changes in IU were associated 
with changes in symptoms across three different cognitive behavior therapy protocols for 
depression (n = 108), social anxiety disorder (n = 88), or generalized anxiety disorder (n = 
62) in a community mental health clinic. IU was associated with reductions in repetitive 
negative thinking in all treatments, which is consistent with IU being a transdiagnostic and 
‘trans-therapy’ process of change. Changes in IU were also associated with symptom relief in 
the social anxiety disorder and generalized anxiety disorder groups, but not in the depression 
group. Implications of these findings are discussed within the broader literature of 
transdiagnostic approaches to emotional disorders. 
 
Key Words: transdiagnostic, intolerance of uncertainty, generalized anxiety disorder, social 
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The search for universal transdiagnostic and trans-therapy change processes: 
evidence for intolerance of uncertainty 
The search for transdiagnostic mechanisms that maintain emotional disorders has 
gathered considerable momentum over the last decade. Transdiagnostic approaches seek to 
identify and target factors that breach traditional diagnostic boundaries and perpetuate more 
than one disorder (McEvoy, Nathan, & Norton, 2009; Norton & Paulus, in press). The 
rationale for targeting transdiagnostic factors across emotional disorders is compelling, 
including common genetic heritabilities (Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Heath, & Eaves, 1992) and 
underlying latent structures (Barlow, 2002; Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998; Carragher, 
Krueger, Eaton, & Slade, 2015), similar efficacy of pharmacological and psychotherapeutic 
interventions (Norton, 2008), high rates of comorbidity (Brown, Campbell, Lehman, 
Grisham, & Mancill, 2001), and evidence that comorbid disorders can remit during treatment 
for a primary disorder (Borkovec, Abel, & Newman, 1995). A range of transdiagnostic 
cognitive and behavioral processes have been identified (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & 
Shafran, 2004), and the race is on to develop psychological treatments that efficiently and 
effectively alleviate suffering by targeting these factors (e.g., Barlow et al., 2011; Dear et al., 
2015; Norton, 2012; Titov et al., 2015). The potential advantages of transdiagnostic 
treatments include the ability to simultaneously treat multiple comorbid disorders, and the 
ease and cost-effectiveness of dissemination compared to a vast range of diagnosis-specific 
treatments (Addis, Wade, & Hatgis, 1999; Barlow, Allen, & Choate, 2004; Norton & Philipp, 
2008). Given that transdiagnostic factors are theorized to maintain emotional disorders, 
changes in these mechanisms during treatment should be associated with symptom reduction 
for multiple disorders. 
The search of transdiagnostic factors can be extended to ‘trans-therapy’ factors, 
defined here as those that are (a) directly or indirectly modified and (b) associated with 
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symptom relief across more than one bona fide therapy. One example of a transdiagnostic 
factor that may not necessarily be a trans-therapy factor is negative metacognitions. Negative 
metacognitions include beliefs that repetitive negative thinking (RNT, e.g., worry or 
rumination) is uncontrollable and potentially harmful (Wells & Cartright-Hatton, 2004), 
which are associated with symptoms of multiple disorders including depression 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003), generalized anxiety disorder (GAD, Thielsch et al., 2015), 
and social anxiety disorder (SAD, McEvoy & Perini, 2009). Whereas metacognitive therapy 
directly targets negative metacognitive beliefs in therapy (Wells, 2009, e.g., “I can’t stop 
worrying about making a fool of myself”), other cognitive approaches focus on challenging 
negative automatic thoughts (e.g., Rapee, Gaston, & Abbott, 2009, “I will make a fool of 
myself”), and thus targeting metacognitive beliefs may not be considered a trans-therapy 
factor. In contrast, reducing withdrawal by scheduling rewarding activities is a component in 
multiple therapies for depression, including behavioural activation (Dimidjian, Barrera, 
Martell, Munoz, & Lewinsohn, 2011) and cognitive therapy (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 
1979), and thus may be considered a trans-therapy factor. However, pleasant and 
achievement-based activity scheduling is most commonly prescribed for depression and thus 
may not be considered transdiagnostic. 
Although transdiagnostic and trans-therapy factors are conceptually separable, it is 
likely that different treatments directly or indirectly modify many of the same transdiagnostic 
mechanisms. It is difficult to demonstrate, for instance, that in vivo exposure modifies arousal 
via habituation without modifying cognition (i.e., negative beliefs about the stimulus). 
Likewise, most cognitive interventions include behavioral components (e.g., imaginal 
exposure, behavioral experiments), which leaves open the possibility that behavioral 
processes are at least in part responsible for symptom change. Impacts across different 
processes occur not only between techniques deriving from alternative theoretical 
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frameworks, but also from a single technique. For instance, a behavioral experiment, whereby 
an individual confronts a feared situation in order to directly test a feared consequence (e.g., 
“I will be ridiculed”), has the potential to modify a range of cognitive processes in addition 
to the negative prediction. To successfully complete a behavioral experiment and test a 
prediction, the individual must override automatic attentional biases towards threatening 
information and also direct attention towards non-threatening information. Constructs such as 
coping self-efficacy and perceived control are also likely to be modified. This scattergun 
approach of most psychological techniques makes it difficult to demonstrate that a particular 
intervention is exclusively acting to modify a specific mechanism described within the 
particular theoretical framework from which it derives, or to rule out that alternative 
theoretical accounts are responsible for change. Collateral effects on multiple potentially 
therapeutic variables are therefore almost inevitable. 
Identifying both transdiagnostic and trans-therapy factors is important for determining 
the most critical treatment foci for achieving successful outcomes from psychotherapy 
regardless of a patient’s diagnostic profile or a therapist’s preferred brand of psychotherapy, 
and may help to integrate the evidence-supported treatment and common factors literatures 
(e.g., Laska, Gurman, & Wampold, 2014). If a subset of transdiagnostic and trans-therapy 
change factors are identified (henceforth referred to as ‘universal factors’), research and 
therapeutic efficiencies could be further increased beyond targeting transdiagnostic factors, as 
the search for the most effective ways of modifying critical processes is prioritized above the 
model or school of psychotherapy from which a technique derives. This study examined 
whether intolerance of uncertainty (IU) could be a candidate universal factor associated with 
symptom change across anxiety disorders and depression (i.e., transdiagnostic) and across 
different treatment protocols (i.e., trans-therapy). 
Intolerance of uncertainty as a transdiagnostic process 
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IU has been defined as a dispositional fear of the unknown (Carleton, 2012) and as the 
tendency to consider the possibility of negative events as unacceptable and threatening 
regardless of the actually probability of the event occurring (Carleton, Sharpe, & Asmundson, 
2007; Dugas, Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001). Carleton (2012) argues that uncertainty is 
inherent in anxiety, where future negative events are anticipated and uncertain (e.g., worry 
about future harm), but not fear, where negative events are more certain or current (e.g., 
imminent physical threat). IU is argued to be a risk factor for anxiety symptoms and anxiety 
disorders, such that individuals higher on this dimension are more likely to experience 
negative emotions in response to ambiguity or uncertainty (Koerner & Dugas, 2008). 
Associations have also been found between IU and depression, which may be a function of 
comorbidity with anxiety, the relationship between IU and RNT (e.g., depressive rumination), 
or a preference for pessimistic certainty rather than tolerating uncertainty (Carleton, 2012). 
The Intolerance of Uncertainty Model was originally developed to explain the 
maintenance of uncontrollable and excessive worry within the context of GAD (Freeston, 
Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). Consistent with this model, IU is elevated in 
individuals with GAD compared to non-anxious controls and is a cognitive vulnerability 
factor for worry and GAD (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998; Koerner & Dugas, 
2008; Dugas et al., 2007; Laugesen, Dugas, & Bukowski, 2003; Sexton, Norton, Walker, & 
Norton, 2003). However, evidence has since accumulated that IU is common across multiple 
emotional disorders, including obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD, Holaway, Heimberg, & 
Coles, 2006; Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003), social anxiety (Boelen & Reijntjes, 
2009; Carleton, Collimore, & Asmundson, 2010; Riskind, Tzur, Williams, Mann, & Shahar, 
2007), panic disorder and agoraphobia (Carleton, Hackl, Fetzner, & McEvoy, 2013; Carleton 
et al., 2007; Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012a), and depression (Buhr &  Dugas, 2002; Dugas, 
Schwartz, & Francis, 2004; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012; van der Heiden et al., 2010).  
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Various forms of RNT that have been historically investigated within the context of 
different disorders, such as worry (GAD), rumination (depression), and post-event processing 
(SAD), have also been shown to be more similar than different (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; 
Harvey et al., 2004; McEvoy & Brans, 2013). In a comprehensive review of the literature, 
Ehring and Watkins (2008) concluded that the process of RNT is identical across different 
disorders and is characterized as being repetitive, difficult to control, negative in content, 
predominantly verbal, relatively abstract, and related to metacognitions (e.g., beliefs that 
engaging in RNT is helpful for preventing catastrophes, or that RNT is harmful and 
uncontrollable). The only differences in RNT across disorders was argued to be the content of 
the thoughts (e.g., threat themes in GAD, hopelessness themes in depression, and social-
evaluative themes in SAD) and temporal orientation, with anxiety-linked RNT being more 
future-focused and depression-linked RNT being more past-focused (although not 
exclusively so). IU and RNT are therefore two key constructs in the Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Model (Freeston et al., 1994) that have been demonstrated to be transdiagnostic. 
Intolerance of uncertainty as a potential ‘trans-therapy’ processes 
The search for trans-therapy processes of change is predicated on the assumption that 
interventions deriving from a particular theoretical model will rarely exclusively modify 
processes identified within that model. Recent evidence that IU may be modified by 
treatments deriving from alternative cognitive behavioural frameworks suggests that IU could 
be a candidate trans-therapy mechanism of change. van der Heiden, Muris, and van der 
Molen (2012) compared IU therapy based on the Intolerance of Uncertainty Model to 
metacognitive therapy to and delayed treatment groups for GAD (N = 126). These therapies 
derive from distinct theoretical frameworks and there are key differences between them, but 
van der Heiden et al.’s (2012) findings were intriguing. While both treatments were highly 
effective, metacognitive therapy was associated with larger reductions on a measure of IU 
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compared to IU therapy. This finding is particularly striking given that demand effects for 
self-report measures should be strongest for a treatment that explicitly targets the construct. 
Presumably IU was not mentioned throughout metacognitive therapy and thus patients should 
feel less obliged to report favorable outcomes on this measure to please the clinicians, 
compared to patients receiving IU therapy. 
One explanation for this finding is that techniques in metacognitive therapy indirectly 
reduce IU. For instance, worry postponement is a metacognitive therapy task designed to 
challenge metacognitive beliefs about worry being helpful (e.g., “worry keeps me safe”) or 
uncontrollable (e.g., “I cannot control my worry”), where patients are encouraged to 
nominate a regular time of day to exclusively engage in worry. Outside of the nominated 
‘worry time’ patients are required to postpone their worry and observe whether they are able 
to control their engagement in worry and whether harm befalls them as a consequence. 
Importantly, when clients learn that they are in fact able to disengage from worry, they are 
also (implicitly) required to tolerate uncertainty that harm will befall them whilst postponing 
worry, and thus they might simultaneously learn that they can cope with uncertainty, nothing 
bad happens when they are uncertain, and the anxiety about uncertainty passes.  
Another study by Mahoney and McEvoy (2012b) also found that IU reduced during 
traditional group cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) for social phobia, and these reductions 
were associated with symptom improvement, despite the fact that IU was not explicitly 
mentioned in the protocol. We are not aware of any treatment studies that report the 
relationship between changes in IU and symptoms in a sample with primary depressive 
disorders, regardless of whether or not the treatment explicitly targeted IU. However, 
Boswell, Thompson-Hollands, Farchione, and Barlow (2013) reported that reductions in IU 
were correlated with reductions in comorbid depression symptoms in individuals with 
primary anxiety disorders who completed a unified (transdiagnostic) treatment that did not 
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explicitly target IU. Overall, these findings suggest that treatments designed to target 
cognitive mechanisms based on a particular theoretical framework can have collateral effects 
on mechanisms from alternative models. Identifying mechanisms associated with symptom 
change across treatments may provide clues about the most important and efficient strategies 
for promoting change regardless of the theoretical framework from which they derive. 
The Current Study 
The vast literature demonstrating that IU is transdiagnostic, together with evidence 
that IU changes across different therapies (trans-therapy), suggests that IU may be a universal 
process associated with change across different emotional disorders and treatments. However, 
further research demonstrating that changes in IU are associated with symptom improvement 
during psychotherapy for different disorders and whilst using different evidence-supported 
treatments is required to build the case for IU as a universal change process. The aim of this 
study was to examine whether changes in IU were associated with changes in RNT and 
symptom relief for individuals with different emotional disorders who received different 
group treatment protocols. The relationships between IU, RNT, and symptom change were 
examined for patients receiving group metacognitive therapy for GAD, imagery-enhanced 
CBT for SAD, and traditional CBT for depression. Changes in IU were hypothesized to be 
associated with changes in RNT and symptoms across these disorders and treatment groups. 
It was further expected that these relationships would remain significant after controlling for 
change in negative affect. Finally, it was expected that patients with higher IU would be more 
likely to drop out of treatment due to the inherent exposure to uncertainty in all three 
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Patients were referred by General Practitioners, Psychiatrists, or Clinical 
Psychologists to a community mental health clinic for psychological treatment of anxiety 
disorders and/or depression. A structured diagnostic interview (Mini International Diagnostic 
Interview, MINI, Lecrubier et al., 1997; Sheehan et al. 1997a, b, 1998) was used to establish 
the presence of DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) anxiety and/or depressive 
disorders. Up to three disorders were recorded in the database.   
Patient’s demographic information is summarized in Table 1. The worry and 
rumination group sample comprised 62 patients with a diagnosis of GAD, two-thirds of 
which were diagnosed with more than one disorder. The most common primary diagnosis 
was GAD (n=45, 72.6%), followed by Major Depression (n=9, 14.5%). A small number of 
patients were diagnosed with primary Dysthymia, Agoraphobia without Panic Disorder (n=2 
each, 3.4%), Panic Disorder without Agoraphobia, OCD, Major Depression in Partial 
Remission, or Type II Bipolar Disorder (n=1 each, 1.6%). All patients had a primary or 
comorbid diagnosis of GAD, and almost a third (31%) had a primary or comorbid depressive 
disorder. The median time since the onset of each patient’s mental health problems was 10 
years (IQR: 5 years to 15 years). Nearly the entire sample (97%) had received previous 
psychiatric treatment, but not responded adequately. A quarter had been hospitalized for a 
mental health problem, and about two-thirds were taking psychotropic medication. The 
median time taking medication was two years (IQR:  6 months to 5 years). 
The social anxiety group sample comprised 88 patients with a diagnosis of SAD. The 
majority (81%) were diagnosed with more than one mental disorder. The most common 
primary disorder was SAD (n=73, 83.0%), followed by Major Depression (n=12, 13.6%), 
Dysthymia, GAD, and Bipolar Disorder Type I (n=1 each, 1.1%). Half the sample (n=44) had 
a primary or secondary depressive diagnosis. Patient’s psychiatric problems were 
longstanding, with a median duration of 10 years (IQR: 6.5 years to 17 years). About a 
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quarter of the sample had attempted suicide. Like the worry and rumination group, the 
majority of social anxiety group patients had previously sought help but failed to respond 
adequately. Two-thirds were taking psychotropic medication, and had been doing so for a 
median duration of 11 months (IQR: 3 months to 4 years). 
The mood management group sample comprised 106 patients with a depressive 
disorder. Again, the vast majority (85%) were diagnosed with more than one mental disorder. 
The primary diagnoses were Major Depression (n=96, 90.6%), Dysthymic Disorder (n=5, 
4.7%), SAD (n=2, 1.9%), GAD (n=2, 1.9%), and PTSD (n=1, 0.9%). The most common 
comorbidities were SAD and GAD. The median duration of patients’ psychiatric problems 
was 12 years (IQR: 10 years to 20 years). More than one third had attempted suicide. Like the 
other groups, nearly all patients had previously sought treatment but had an inadequate 
response. The median duration of medication use was two years (IQR: 3 months to 10 years). 
Overall, the patients in the three samples can be described as suffering from chronic and 
highly comorbid disorders that had proven difficult to treat. 
2.2 Outcome Measures 
2.2.1 Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale-12 (IUS-12, Carleton et al., 2007). The 
IUS-12 is a 12-item version of the original 27-item IUS (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Freeston et al., 
1994) that measures negative beliefs about and reactions to uncertainty. The 12-item version 
has been found to be highly correlated (r = .96) with the full version in undergraduate 
(Carleton et al., 2007; Khawaja & Yu, 2010) and clinical (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011) 
samples. The IUS-12 comprises two subscales, Prospective IU (cognitive anticipation, “I 
always want to know what the future has in store for me”) and Inhibitory IU (behavioral, 
“when it’s time to act, uncertainty paralyses me”), although a total score is commonly used. 
The IUS-12 is associated with symptoms of multiple anxiety disorders and depression even 
when controlling for neuroticism (Boelen, Vrinssen, & van Tulder, 2010; Carleton et al., 
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2010; Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012c; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011, 2012; Norton & Mehta, 
2007), and has been shown to be dimensional rather than taxonic (Carleton et al., 2012). 
Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale from not at all characteristic of me (1) to entirely 
characteristic of me (5). Sum scores on the IUS-12 can range between 7 and 35 (Prospective 
IU), 5 and 25 (Inhibitory IU) and 12 and 60 (Total Score). Internal consistencies in the 
current study were high for the subscales (Prospective IU α = .88, Inhibitory IU α = .87), and 
for the total score (α = .92). 
2.2.2 Repetitive Negative Thinking Questionnaire (RTQ-10, McEvoy, Mahoney, 
& Moulds, 2010; McEvoy, Thibodeau, & Asmundson, 2014). The RTQ is a 
transdiagnostic measure of RNT that was developed by modifying items from the Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990), Ruminative Responses 
Scale (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003) and revised Post-Event Processing 
Questionnaire (McEvoy & Kingsep, 2006) to remove diagnosis-specific content, such as 
references to worry and depression symptoms (Mahoney, McEvoy, & Moulds, 2012; 
McEvoy et al., 2010). The 10-item trait version of the RTQ used in this study has a 
unidimensional structure, distinguishes well between clinical and non-clinical populations, 
and correlates very highly (r = .95) with a longer 27-item version of the scale (McEvoy et al., 
2010; McEvoy et al., 2014). Example items are “Once I start thinking about the situation, I 
can’t stop” and “I think about the situation all the time.” Items are rated with respect to 
respondents’ experience when they are distressed or upset on a 5-point Likert scale from not 
true at all (1), somewhat true (3), to very true (5). RTQ-10 (henceforth RTQ) total scores can 
fall between 10 and 50. Internal consistency in the current study was high (α = .88). 
2.2.3 Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). The PANAS features 10-item positive (PANAS-POS) and negative (PANAS-NEG) 
affect subscales, although only the PANAS-NEG subscale was used in this study. The 10 
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negative emotions (e.g., distressed, upset, guilty ashamed) are rated on a 5-point response 
scale to indicate the extent to which the respondent generally feels this way: very slightly or 
not at all (1), a little (2), moderately (3), quite a bit (4) or extremely (5). Total scores can 
range between 10 and 50. Crawford and Henry (2003) have provided evidence of high 
internal consistency (αs = .90-.95) and construct validity (including convergent and divergent 
validity). Internal consistency in the current study was high (α = .84). 
2.2.4 Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) and Social Phobia Scale (SPS, 
Mattick & Clarke, 1998). The SPS and SIAS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998) are 20-item 
measures of performance and interaction anxiety, respectively. The SPS assesses situations in 
which the person is the focus of attention and observed by others (e.g., “I become anxious if I 
have to write in front of other people”, “I get nervous that people are staring at me as I walk 
down the street”). The SIAS contains items reflecting cognitive, affective, and behavioral 
reactions to interaction situations (e.g., “I have difficulty making eye-contact with others”, 
“When mixing socially I am uncomfortable”). The 5-point response scale for both scales is 
not at all (0), slightly (1), moderately (2), very (3), or extremely (4) characteristic of me. 
Total scores for both measures can range from 0 to 80. These scales have demonstrated high 
12-week test-retest reliabilities (SIAS r = .92; SPS r = .93, Mattick & Clarke, 1998) and 
sensitivity to change (Cox, Ross, Swinson, & Direnfeld, 1998). Internal consistencies in the 
current study were high for the SIAS (α = .85) and the SPS (α = .90).  
2.2.5 Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II, Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The BDI-
II is a 21-item measure of depression symptoms experienced over the previous two weeks. 
Items are rated on a 4-point scale and total scores can range from 0 to 63. Internal consistency 
and test–retest reliability (r = .93 over 1 week) are well established (Beck et al., 1996), and 
evidence for construct validity has been demonstrated (Dozois et al., 1998). Support for 
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convergent and discriminant validity has also been reported (Steer et al., 1997). Internal 
consistency in the current sample was high (α = .88). 
2.2.6 Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ, Meyer et al., 1990). The PSWQ is 
a 16 item trait-based questionnaire commonly used to measure pathological worry in GAD 
(e.g., “I am always worrying about something”). Respondents rate the extent to which each 
item applies to them on a 5-point scale ranging from not at all typical of me (1) to very 
typical of me (5). Five negatively worded items are reverse scored before summing to form a 
total score ranging from 16 to 80 with higher scores reflecting greater levels of worry. The 
PSWQ has demonstrated good validity and reliability (Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992; 
Meyer et al., 1990). Internal consistency in the current study was high (α=.92). 
2.3 Procedure 
Patients referred for treatment of an anxiety disorder or depression were posted the 
questionnaire battery to complete prior to their initial assessment, at which the MINI was 
completed by a Clinical Psychologist experienced in both the assessment and treatment of 
emotional disorders. All cases, diagnoses, and treatment plans were presented and discussed 
at weekly clinic meetings. Patients with SAD, GAD, or depression nominated their most 
distressing disorder and on this basis were typically allocated to the social anxiety group, 
worry and rumination group, or mood management group, respectively. As is standard in 
clinical practice, in some instances the patient and assessing therapist determined that a 
comorbid disorder required treatment before the primary disorder, so the patient was 
allocated to a group targeting the comorbid disorder. For instance, patients with long-standing 
and temporally primary SAD may have completed a mood management group if their 
depression was severe and likely to interfere with treatment targeting SAD. During this 
assessment session patients were provided with general information about the content of the 
group program (e.g., “you will learn practical strategies for helping you to manage your 
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[social anxiety, depression, worry and rumination] more effectively”), which excluded any 
reference to increasing tolerance of uncertainty per se. All measures were completed 
following the final group session (post-treatment), and at a one-month follow-up 
appointment. Patients provided informed written consent for their clinical data to be used for 
the purposes of quality improvement, evaluation, and publication, and the procedures were 
approved for each group program by the Hospital’s Human Research Ethics Committee 
(QI_2014_04, QI_2014_05, QI_2014_23). 
2.4 Treatment 
The worry and rumination group (McEvoy, Erceg-Hurn, Anderson, Campbell, & 
Nathan, 2015; McEvoy, Erceg-Hurn, Anderson, Campbell, Swan, et al., 2015), social anxiety 
group (McEvoy & Saulsman, 2014; McEvoy, Erceg-Hurn, Saulsman, & Thibodeau, 2015), 
and mood management group (McEvoy & Nathan, 2007) protocols used in this study have 
previously been evaluated and found to be highly effective and to meet international 
benchmarks (i.e. efficacy and effectiveness trials). All groups were co-facilitated by two 
senior clinicians (masters- or doctoral-level clinical psychologists), or one senior clinician 
and one clinical psychology trainee. All senior clinicians had participated in the published 
trials of the group protocols. Importantly, the concept of IU is not explicitly discussed in any 
of the protocols, thereby allowing an assessment of whether IU changes as a consequence of 
implementing the standard procedures within each treatment whilst minimizing social 
desirability biases. All three groups include a one-month follow-up session at which progress 
is reviewed, difficulties are problem-solved, and future management plans are developed. 
The worry and rumination group protocol is based on Wells and Mathews’ (1996) 
Self-Regulatory Executive Function model and Wells’ (2009) metacognitive therapy for 
emotional disorders, although there are some departures from Wells’ approach (see McEvoy, 
Erceg-Hurn, Anderson, Campbell, Swan et al., 2015, for more details). The 6-session worry 
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and rumination group (plus one month follow-up) includes psychoeducation and socialization 
to the metacognitive formulation, including negative beliefs about RNT, unhelpful behaviors 
used to avoid RNT (e.g., situational avoidance, suppression), attentional biases, and positive 
beliefs about RNT. Subsequent sessions included thought challenging and behavioral 
experiments targeting negative (e.g., RNT is uncontrollable and dangerous) and positive (e.g., 
RNT is helpful) metacognitive beliefs. Attentional flexibility was targeted through several 
attention training tasks that involved sustaining attention on present moment activity and 
mindfulness techniques. Active coping (structured problem-solving) was used as a technique 
to reduce maladaptive behavioral symptoms (e.g., situational avoidance) and to promote more 
adaptive approach behaviors. The final session involved a review of the key principles and 
the development of self-management plans. 
The 12-week (plus one-month follow-up) imagery-enhanced social anxiety group 
(McEvoy, Erceg-Hurn, Saulsman, et al., 2015) is based on Rapee et al.’s (2009) CBT 
protocol and includes psychoeducation, cognitive monitoring and restructuring, in vivo 
exposure conducted as a series of behavioral experiments involving hypothesis testing, safety 
behavior elimination, video-feedback to correct distorted self-images, attention training, 
identification and challenging of negative core beliefs and relapse prevention (see also 
McEvoy, Nathan, Rapee, & Campbell, 2012). The protocol includes imagery techniques 
within each component (see McEvoy & Saulsman, 2014, for more details). 
The 10-session mood management group (plus one month follow-up) is based on 
Beck et al.’s (1979) depression manual and incorporates elements of Barlow and Craske’s 
(1994) anxiety manual to address comorbid anxiety. Key components of the manual are 
psychoeducation about depression and comorbid anxiety, behavioral activation, calming 
techniques to bring attention to the present moment and reduce arousal, behavioral 
experiments, and cognitive restructuring (see McEvoy & Nathan, 2007, for more details). 
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2.5 Analyses 
All analyses were intent-to-treat, with all available data used in each analysis. Pearson 
correlations were used to examine the relationship between pre-treatment IUS-12 scores and 
attendance. Mixed-effects models were used to examine changes in each outcome over time, 
and to study associations between the IUS-12, PANAS, and symptoms. Within-treatment 
effect sizes (standardized mean changes) were calculated for each outcome by subtracting the 
estimated post-treatment (or follow up) mean from the pre-treatment mean, and dividing by 
the observed pre-treatment standard deviation (Morris, 2008). Effect sizes of .20, .50 and .80 
were regarded as small, medium, and large, respectively (Cumming, 2012). 
In order to test whether changes in intolerance of uncertainty and negative affect 
during treatment predicted symptoms, the IUS-12 and PANAS were modelled as time-
varying covariates. A time-invariant covariate is a variable that does not change during 
treatment, such as gender, whereas a time-varying covariate can take on different values at 
each measurement occasion. An appealing aspect of fitting models with time-varying 
covariates is that it enables within- and between-person effects to be disentangled. For 
example, the Intolerance of Uncertainty Model predicts that at any given time point, patients 
with high IUS-12 scores should have more severe symptoms than patients with low IUS-12 
scores. This is a between-person effect, as it describes how differences in IUS-12 scores 
between individuals are associated with symptoms. It also follows from the IUS-12 model 
that the degree to which IU changes within an individual should be related to changes in that 
individual’s symptoms. This is a within-person effect. The focus of the present analyses was 
on the within-person effects – in other words, are changes within individuals on the IUS-12 
during treatment associated with changes in their symptoms, and is this still true after 
controlling for within-person changes in negative affect? 
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We followed Hedeker and Gibbons’ (2006) procedure for fitting mixed-effect models 
with time-varying covariates. Each patient had up to three IUS-12 scores (eg 28 pre-
treatment, 20 post-treatment, 9 follow up). For each individual, we computed a mean IUS-12 
score, for example (28+20+9)/3=19, and the deviations around this mean (28 - 19 = 9, 20 – 
19 = 1, 9 – 19 = -10). The same procedure was followed for the PANAS. 
For each outcome measure, two models were run. In the first model, the fixed effects 
were an intercept, time, each patient’s IUS-12 mean, and their IUS-12 deviation scores. The 
PANAS mean and deviation scores were then added to the model. The regression coefficient 
for the IUS-12 deviation scores in these models indicates whether change on the IUS-12 is 
associated with changes on symptom measures. All models included random intercept terms 
for each patient, and a random slope for time if doing so provided a better fit to the data that 
the random-intercept only model. For some outcomes time was fit as a categorical rather than 
continuous variable, if doing so provided a better fit to the data (e.g., because change between 
post-treatment and follow-up did not follow the same trajectory as between pre- and post-
treatment). All models were run with data from all participants within each group and then re-
run including only participants with primary SAD (social anxiety group), primary GAD 
(worry and rumination group), and primary depression (mood management group). The 
pattern of effect sizes was almost identical so only results for the full samples are reported. 
Results 
3.1 Worry and Rumination Group 
 The mean number of sessions completed was 6.14 (SD = 1.39) out of a possible 7 
(including follow-up), and the median was 7 sessions.  Eleven percent of participants 
completed between 2 and 4 sessions, and 89% completed five or more. Pre-treatment IUS-12 
total scores were not related to the number of sessions completed, r < .01, 95% CI [-.27, .27], 
p = .98. Changes over the course of treatment for each outcome measure can be found in 
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Table 2, and are plotted in the first column of Figure 1. There were very large reductions on 
the PSWQ and RTQ during treatment, and patients continued to improve over the follow up 
period. IUS-12 and PANAS scores also improved substantially, with effect sizes exceeding 1 
SD by follow up. The figure suggests that change on the IUS-12 between post-treatment and 
follow up continued at the same rate as was observed during treatment, whereas the rate of 
change on other variables slowed somewhat. Within-person change on the IUS-12 was 
associated with PSWQ scores over the course of treatment, and this association persisted 
even after controlling for change on PANAS scores. The relevant regression coefficient (for 
the IUS-12 deviation term) was .47 for the model without the PANAS, 95% CI [.21, .72], p = 
.001, and .31 after controlling for the PANAS, 95% CI [.06, .56], p = .015.  Change on the 
PANAS was also associated with PSWQ scores, controlling for change in IUS-12 scores, Est 
= .83, 95% CI [.42, 1.24], p < .001.  The findings were similar when the dependent variable 
was the RTQ. Change on the IUS-12 was associated with change on the RTQ, Est = .35, 95% 
CI [.16, .53], p <.001, and the association was still present after controlling for PANAS, Est = 
.25, 95% CI [.06, .45], p = .011. Change on the PANAS was also uniquely associated with 
change on the RTQ, Est = .50, 95% CI [.17, .83], p = .003 
3.2 Social Anxiety Group 
 The mean number of sessions completed was 9.98 (SD = 3.39) out of a possible 13 
(including follow-up), and the median was 11. The majority of participants (77%) completed 
nine or more sessions; 11% completed between 1 and 4 sessions, and 11% completed 
between 5 and 8 sessions. Pre-treatment IUS-12 scores were unrelated to the number of 
sessions attended, r = -.02, 95% CI [-0.28, .19], p =.82. Changes over the course of treatment 
for each outcome measure can be found in Table 3, and are plotted in the middle column of 
Figure 1, except for the SPS (the trajectory for the SPS was practically identical to that for the 
SIAS). There were very large reductions on the SIAS and SPS, a large reduction on the 
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PANAS and RTQ, and moderate to large reductions on the IUS-12. Like in the worry and 
rumination group, patients continued to improve between post-treatment and follow up, 
particularly on the IUS-12. Change on the IUS-12 over the course of treatment was 
associated with change on the RTQ, Est = .35, 95% CI [.19 .51], p < .001. The magnitude of 
the association only slightly reduced after controlling for the PANAS, Est = .31, 95% CI [.14, 
.48], p < .001. Change on the PANAS was more weakly and not significantly associated with 
change on the RTQ, Est = .25, 95% CI [.00, .50], p = .052. Change on the IUS-12 was also 
found to be related to change on the SIAS, without (Est = .59, 95% CI [.33, .83], p <.001) and 
with (Est .47, 95% CI [. 26, .69], p < .001) the PANAS included in the model. Change on the 
PANAS was also uniquely predictive of change on the SIAS, Est = 1.20, 95% CI [.89, 1.51], 
p < .001. The results were similar for the SPS. Change on the IUS-12 was significantly 
associated with change on the SPS, Est = .57, 95% CI [.29, .85], p <. 001, and the 
relationship held after controlling for change on the PANAS, Est = .45, 95% CI [.20, .70], p < 
.001. Change on the PANAS was also associated with change on the SPS when controlling 
for the IUS-12, Est = 1.06, 95% CI [.69, 1.42], p < .001. 
3.3 Mood Management Group 
 The mean number of sessions attended was 7.65 (SD = 2.99) out of a possible 11 
(including follow-up), and the median was 8.  Twelve percent of participants completed 
between 1 and 3 sessions; 28% completed between 4 and 7, and 60% completed 8 or more. 
Pre-treatment IUS-12 scores were not related to the number of sessions attended, r = .06, 
95% CI [-.13, .25], p = .55. Changes in each outcome measure can be found in Table 4 and 
the right-hand column of Figure 1. There was a large change on the BDI-II, while changes on 
the RTQ and PANAS were more modest than for the other groups, and change on the IUS-12 
was small. Unlike the other groups, there were no statistically or clinically significant 
changes on any outcome between post-treatment and follow up. 
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 Over the course of treatment, change on the IUS-12 was associated with change on 
the RTQ, Est = .39, 95% CI [.23, .55], p < .001. This relationship was still evident after 
controlling for PANAS, Est = .39, CI [.24, .55], p < .001. The PANAS was also uniquely 
related to the RTQ, Est = .19, 95% CI [.04, .34], p = .014. In contrast, there was only a weak 
association between change in IUS-12 and BDI-II that was not statistically significant, Est = 
.19, 95% CI [-.13, .39], p = .16. When the PANAS was added to the model, the relevant 
coefficient was .16, 95% CI [-.08, .40], p = .20. Unlike the IUS-12, change in PANAS scores 
was uniquely associated with change in BDI-II, Est = .57, 95% CI [.34, .81], p < .001 
3.4 IUS-12 Subscales 
 All analyses were rerun using the IUS-12 subscales rather than the total score. The 
pattern of results was practically identical in all cases except two. For the worry and 
rumination group, change in Prospective IU was a statistically significant predictor of PSWQ 
scores after controlling for the PANAS, Est = .50, 95% CI [,10, .89], p = .014, whereas 
Inhibitory IU just failed to achieve statistical significance, Est = .50, 95% CI [-.04, 1.04], p = 
.071.  The same pattern of results was present when the dependent variable was the RTQ. 
Prospective IU was a statistically significant predictor after controlling for the PANAS (Est = 
.44, 95% CI [.14, .74], p = .005) while Inhibitory IU was not (Est = .35, CI [-.07, .77], p = 
.102.  While the p-values for Inhibitory IU after controlling for the PANAS in both cases are 
above .05, the confidence intervals are wide and consist almost entirely of positive values. 
This suggest that changes in Inhibitory IU across therapy probably are associated with 
changes in RNT and worry after controlling for negative affect, but that the sample size in the 
current study was too small to demonstrate a statistically significant relationship. 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to determine whether IU is associated with symptom 
change across different emotional disorders (GAD, SAD, depression) and different treatment 
Intolerance of uncertainty as a universal change process 22 
group protocols (metacognitive therapy, imagery-enhanced cognitive behavior therapy, and 
traditional cognitive therapy, respectively). It was hypothesized that changes in IU would be 
consistently associated with changes in RNT and symptoms across disorders and treatments, 
which was supported for RNT and partially supported for symptoms with the exception being 
depression symptoms. The significant relationships remained after controlling for the higher 
order construct of negative affectivity, thus supporting the discriminant validity of IU from 
negative affect and suggesting that changes in IU were incrementally associated with changes 
in RNT and symptoms for social anxiety and worry beyond reductions in general negative 
affect. These findings are broadly consistent with IU being a universal process of change, 
defined here as both a transdiagnostic and trans-therapy construct. 
The prediction that IU would be associated with greater treatment dropout was not 
supported for any of the treatments and suggests that IU need not be an impediment to 
treatment engagement. We are not aware of any previous research investigating the 
relationship between IU and treatment attrition, although studies of treatments targeting IU 
have demonstrated low levels of dropout (<10%, Dugas et al., 2003). All three treatments in 
the current study titrated uncertainty by using a graded approach to cognitive and behavioural 
change (i.e., least to most challenging), which may have increased treatment acceptability for 
high IU individuals. 
Our findings are consistent with an extensive literature demonstrating that IU is 
associated with a range of emotional disorders in cross-sectional, experimental, longitudinal, 
and treatment studies (Carleton, 2012; Norton & Paulus, in press), and with evidence that 
self-reported IU significantly reduces and is associated with symptom change during CBT 
protocols that do not explicitly target IU (Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012b; van der Heiden et al., 
2012). It is arguable that techniques in all three protocols encouraged engagement with 
inherently uncertain tasks. For example, the metacognitive therapy protocol (worry and 
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rumination group) encouraged patients to regularly postpone engagement in RNT to test the 
controllability of their RNT and uncertain negative consequences of disengaging from RNT. 
The imagery-enhanced CBT protocol encouraged patients with SAD to regularly confront 
inherently uncertain social-evaluative situations to test their fears of evaluation. The 
traditional cognitive behavior therapy protocol (mood management group) encouraged 
individuals with depression to increase their engagement in a range of activities and to 
challenge their negative beliefs, despite uncertainty about whether these tasks would be 
helpful for improving their mood. 
Interestingly, after controlling for negative affectivity, Prospective IU more strongly 
predicted changes in worry than Inhibitory IU for patients completing the worry and 
rumination group. This finding is consistent with previous evidence that Prospective but not 
Inhibitory IU mediates the relationship between neuroticism and worry in mixed anxiety 
disorder samples (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012). Prospective IU assesses concerns about future 
uncertainty (e.g., “I always want to know what the future has in store for me”), whereas 
Inhibitory IU assesses behavioral inhibition (e.g., “When it’s time to act, uncertainty 
paralyzes me”). The focus on the future and cognitive symptoms likely explains the stronger 
relationship between Prospective IU and the often future-oriented nature of worry (Ehring & 
Watkins, 2008). Overall, our findings suggest that patients in all three programs were less 
fearful of (Prospective IU) and paralyzed by (Inhibitory IU) the unknown following 
treatment, and these changes were associated with reductions in RNT and anxiety symptoms. 
The lack of an association between changes in IU and depression symptoms during 
the mood management group was unexpected. RNT is a well-established vulnerability factor 
for depression symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Given that 
reductions in IU were associated with reductions RNT in the mood management group, it was 
expected that reductions in IU would also be associated with reductions in depression 
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symptoms. An alternative mechanism through which IU could maintain depression is 
pessimistic certainty (Carlton, 2012), whereby negative predictions are expected to be highly 
likely (almost certain) in preference to tolerating uncertainty about an outcome. Reductions in 
IU should therefore reduce the tendency to expect negative outcomes as being likely, which, 
in turn, should positively impact on depression symptoms. 
One potential explanation for the lack of an association in this study is therefore that 
the impact of IU on depression symptoms is indirect, perhaps via other constructs such as 
negative thoughts about the certainty of negative outcomes and absence of positive outcomes 
(Miranda, Rontes, & Marroquín, 2008). These forms of depressive certainty may be acquired 
with increasing fluency via RNT and, in turn, lead to hopelessness and worsening symptoms. 
Miranda and colleagues (2008) found evidence that while both anxiety and depression are 
characterized by pessimistic certainty about negative events, pessimistic certainty about the 
absence of positive events is unique to depression, and that these beliefs may be more 
proximal than IU to depression symptoms. Therefore, while IU may increase vulnerability to 
anxiety and depression via RNT, additional intermediate processes may be particularly 
important for more fully understanding the relationship between IU and depression 
symptoms. CBT for depression may therefore require a process of directly testing pessimistic 
certainty (e.g., “I know I enjoyed soccer in the past, but I won’t now”), rather than 
challenging IU per se (“I know I enjoyed soccer in the past, but I’m unsure if I will now”). 
Another potential explanation for the lack of association between changes in IU and 
changes in depression symptoms is that the magnitude of change in IU was smaller in the 
mood management group than for the other groups, which may have attenuated the 
association. It is plausible that behavioral activation within traditional CBT for depression 
involves a lower dose of exposure to uncertainty that the other treatments, as patients are 
encouraged to engage with activities known to be previously associated with pleasure and 
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achievement. In contrast, patients in the social anxiety program regularly engage in inherently 
uncertain social situations with unfamiliar conversational partners and where the outcomes of 
the interactions are largely unknown. Likewise, patients in the worry and rumination group 
are required to disengage from habitual RNT and overcontrol strategies, which may result in 
a larger dose of uncertainty than CBT for depression. 
Our finding that changes in IU explained unique variance in RNT in all three groups, 
and symptoms in the social anxiety and worry and rumination groups, is consistent with 
previous studies (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2013; Sexton et al., 2003). In contrast, Talkovsky and 
Norton (2014) recently found that within their transdiagnostic clinical sample anxiety 
sensitivity and IU failed to explain unique variance in state anxiety beyond negative affect. 
The researchers interpreted their findings as evidence that transdiagnostic CBT achieves 
symptom change by modifying the higher order construct of negative affectivity, thus 
deemphasizing the role of IU and anxiety sensitivity. There are several potential explanations 
for the discrepancy between Talkovsky and Norton’s (2014) findings and our study. 
First, Talkovsky and Norton (2014) used the state anxiety scale of the State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 2003) as the 
outcome variable, which may have been differentially sensitive to disorder-specific symptom 
changes than the measures used in this study. Moreover, the STAI shared a substantial 
proportion of variance (74%) with the PANAS negative affect subscale in Talkovsky and 
Norton’s (2014) study, leaving little variance to be explained by IU. Second, although there 
are commonalities in the techniques used across the treatments (e.g., forms of exposure and 
cognitive restructuring), Talkovsky and Norton’s (2014) transdiagnostic intervention may 
operate more broadly on NA compared to the treatments in the current study. It may be that 
the disorder-specific foci of our treatments more specifically target IU within each problem 
area, and indeed there is evidence that disorder-specific IU explains unique variance in 
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symptoms above and beyond trait IU (Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012a; Thibodeau et al., 2015). 
Third, the inclusion of anxiety sensitivity within Talkovsky and Norton’s (2014) model may 
have usurped variance that would have been captured by IU. Notwithstanding the differences 
in findings in relation to IU, it is noteworthy that negative affectivity was a unique predictor 
of symptom change (and the sole predictor for depression symptoms) in our study, which is 
consistent with Talkovsky and Norton’s (2014) findings. 
The correlational nature of this study is an important limitation, so we are unable to 
draw any causal conclusions about the relationship between changes in IU and outcomes. 
Changes in IU may be a cause, consequence, or epiphenomenon of RNT and symptom 
change. Although insufficient, the associations found in our study are necessary for a 
universal process and provide some empirical justification for further research in this area. 
The use of self-reported outcomes, which are vulnerable to social desirability biases, is 
another limitation. Patients who were more likely to report lower symptoms at post-treatment 
to please the clinicians may have been more likely to also report lower IU, even though IU 
was not explicitly mentioned as a treatment target. Experimental research and clinical studies 
using behavioral assessments of IU before, during, and after treatment would be useful for 
addressing these limitations. The absence of a control group is another limitation of this 
study. IU is generally considered a trait that is stable over time without intervention 
(Carleton, 2012; Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012a), but without a control group we are unable to 
definitively attribute changes in IU to the active components of the interventions. 
Randomised controlled trials using control groups without the purported active treatment 
components are therefore required. The treatment protocols in the current study were also 
limited to forms of cognitive behavior therapy and to a restricted range of emotional 
disorders, so the findings may not generalize to other treatment approaches or disorders. 
There is evidence, however, that acceptance-based approaches also impact on multiple 
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constructs including IU (Treanor, Erisman, Salters-Pedneault, Roemer, & Orsillo, 2011). 
Exposure to uncertainty may also be important for reducing relapse in emotional disorders 
(Arch & Abramowitz, 2015), so assessing the relationship between reductions in IU and 
longer-term outcomes is another important future research direction. 
Another limitation was that IU, RNT, and NA are only a subset of potential universal 
change processes, which precluded an evaluation of the relative contribution of these factors 
to other potentially important change processes. Future research should simultaneously 
compare a broader array of candidate factors (e.g., perceived control, psychological 
flexibility, avoidance, metacognitive beliefs), to identify those that provide incremental 
explanatory power. The search for universal processes will not be immune to redundancy 
unless multiple candidate processes are simultaneously assessed so those that (a) explain the 
largest proportion of unique variance in emotional disorder symptoms, and (b) most powerful 
and efficient at ameliorating emotional disorder symptoms, can be identified.  
The search for universal processes of change offers hope for greater conceptual clarity 
and clinical parsimony. Hagger (2014) described the ‘déjà-variable phenomenon’ in the 
social psychology literature; “the feeling that one has seen a variable with the same definition 
and content before only referred to by a different term. And if not precisely identical, one can 
recognize considerable overlap and redundancy in the definition of variables making it 
difficult to establish whether constructs with different terms are appreciably different in 
content (p. 1).” Hagger argues that conceptual redundancies cause difficulties in statistical 
analysis (e.g. multicolinearity) and the interpretation of research findings, which ultimately 
“hinders the progress of psychological science (p. 1.)”  We argue that the déjà-variable 
phenomenon is alive and well in the clinical psychology literature, which can result in 
considerable inefficiencies and obfuscations that retard the accumulation and synthesis of 
knowledge. Researchers investigating substantively identical constructs in parallel and 
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steadfastly maintaining that they are unique may be better off pooling resources and focusing 
instead on the vast commonalities (Castonguay, 2011). As recently noted by Mennin, Ellard, 
Fresco, and Gross (2013) in relation to traditional and recent CBTs, “…shining the light here 
[on whether recent third wave CBTs are novel] may inordinately focus the discourse on the 
fringes, thereby picking apart smaller differences at the boundaries while ignoring the 
substantial overlap and synergy of these approaches (p. 235).” We agree that much can be 
gained by focusing on the commonalities across disorders, theories, and therapeutic 
approaches to treating emotional disorders. 
Mennin et al. (2013) recommended a shift from comparing the efficacy of similar 
therapeutic approaches towards the identification of common goals, change principles, and 
therapeutic processes across therapies. These researchers outlined a framework for 
considering these commonalities, where behavioral adaptation was the superordinate goal 
targeted by all CBTs and context engagement, attention change, and cognitive change were 
common change principles that facilitate goal attainment. Mennin et al. proposed that a range 
of techniques (e.g. exposure, cognitive reframing, defusion, acceptance, behavioral 
activation) may be emphasized to a greater or lesser extent across therapeutic approaches, but 
all target one or more of these common change principles. The findings from our study 
suggest that applying techniques to contexts, attentional biases, and cognitive content 
associated with IU may be important for promoting behavioral adaption for individuals high 
on this dimension. Treatments that increase engagement with uncertainty, modify attentional 
bias to threat within uncertain contexts, and modify cognitions relating to uncertainty (e.g., I 
can’t stand not knowing!), may be associated with reductions in RNT and symptom relief in 
multiple emotional disorders. IU may therefore provide a useful framework within which to 
target these common processes in therapy. An individual with SAD who is uncertain about 
judgment, an individual with GAD who is uncertain about harm befalling a loved one, and an 
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individual with major depression who is uncertain about whether the future is hopeless may 
all benefit from engaging with contexts associated with their IU whilst learning to increase 
attentional flexibility by broadening it to non-threatening and hopeful aspects of the 
experience, and ultimately modifying the meaning of uncertainty within those contexts. For 
instance, therapeutic goals may be to engender a sense of curiosity in patients about whether 
uncertainty is in fact tolerable and often benign, and to help them discover that uncertain 
situations often provide important opportunities for new information and personal growth. 
The most robust change processes are likely to be those that are associated with 
change across disorders and interventions. This study found evidence that IU was associated 
with reductions in RNT across different group treatment protocols for GAD, SAD, and 
depression, and with reductions in symptoms of GAD and SAD, even after controlling for 
negative affectivity. Further research is required to determine whether IU is separable from 
other transdiagnostic constructs, and to assess the unique contribution that targeting IU can 
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(N = 62) 
SAG 
(N = 88) 
MMG 
(N = 106) 
Age 36.6 (12.3) 28.9 (10.2) 37.0 (12.7) 
Female 69 55 74 
Australian born 76 78 74 
Employed 60 49 43 
    Marital Status1 
   Single 47 80 52 
Married/Defacto 44 17 27 
Divorced/Separated 10 4 20 
    Education 
   Less than High School 24 30 33 
High School 9 33 27 
Certificate/Diploma 10 5 20 
Degree 57 32 20 
    Number of Diagnoses 
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1 34 19 15 
2 40 48 47 
3 or more 26 33 38 
    Primary Diagnosis 
   Major Depression / Dysthymia 18 15 95 
Social Anxiety 0 83 2 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder 73 1 2 
    Primary and Comorbid Diagnoses 
   Major Depression / Dysthymia 31 50 100 
Social Anxiety 19 100 44 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder 100 28 42 
    Attempted Suicide 13 23 37 
Previous Treatment 97 88 92 
Psychiatric Hospitalisation 26 22 32 
Currently Medicated 63 67 87 
Note.  The numbers are percentages except for age, which is a mean and standard deviation.   
1 One patient in the MMG was widowed. WRG = worry and rumination group, SAG = social 
anxiety group, MMG = mood management group. 
Table 2. 
Worry and Rumination Group Outcomes 
Measure 
and Time 
      
Mean Change from 
Pre-Treatment   
Standardized 
Mean Change 
M SE   Est 95% CI   d 95% CI 
IUS-12 
          Pre 39.96 1.32 
        Post 32.99 1.38 
 
6.97 4.65 9.30 
 
  .67 .45   .89 
Follow Up 29.20 1.46 
 
10.76 8.37 13.16 
 
1.03 .80 1.26 
           PANAS 
          Pre 28.26 0.91 
        Post 20.59 0.98 
 
7.67 6.29 9.05 
 
1.08 .88 1.27 
Follow Up 18.93 0.99 
 
9.33 7.90 10.76 
 
1.31 1.11 1.51 
           RTQ 
          Pre 40.34 0.90 
        Post 27.79 1.25 
 
12.55 10.30 14.79 
 
1.79 1.47 2.11 
Follow Up 25.93 1.37 
 
14.41 11.87 16.95 
 
2.06 1.70 2.42 
           PSWQ 
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Pre 66.53 1.07 
        Post 51.16 1.59 
 
15.37 12.36 18.39 
 
1.82 1.46 2.18 
Follow Up 47.96 1.69   18.57 15.47 21.67   2.20 1.83 2.57 
 
Note. Est = Estimated change from pre-to post-treatment, or pre-treatment to follow up. CI = 
Confidence interval. Pre-treatment SDs used to compute the standardized mean changes were 10.41 
(IUS-12), 7.11 (PANAS), 7.00 (RTQ) and 8.44 (PSWQ).  P-values for all changes in outcome during 
treatment were < .001. IUS-12 = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale-12, PANAS = Positive and 
Negative Affect Scale, RTQ = Repetitive Thinking Questionnaire, PSWQ = Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire. 
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Table 3. 
Social Anxiety Group Outcomes 
Measure 
and Time 
      
Mean Change from 
Pre-Treatment   
Standardized 
Mean Change 
M SE   Est 95% CI   d 95% CI 
IUS-12 
          Pre 38.21 1.09 
        Post 32.34 1.29 
 
5.86 3.73 7.99 
 
.57 .36 .78 
Follow Up 29.16 1.33 
 
9.05 6.46 11.65 
 
.88 .63 1.14 
           PANAS 
          Pre 28.50 0.70 
        Post 21.78 0.86 
 
6.72 5.23 8.22 
 
1.03 .80 1.25 
Follow Up 20.73 0.91 
 
7.76 6.11 9.42 
 
1.19 .93 1.44 
           RTQ 
          Pre 38.22 0.68 
        Post 32.61 0.99 
 
5.61 3.65 7.57 
 
  .88 .57 1.19 
Follow Up 30.30 0.99 
 
7.92 5.69 10.16 
 
1.25 .89 1.60 
           SIAS 
          Pre 59.89 1.12 
        Post 39.76 1.64 
 
20.13 16.85 23.41 
 
1.92 1.61 2.23 
Follow Up 36.99 1.91 
 
22.90 19.22 26.58 
 
2.18 1.83 2.53 
           SPS 
          Pre 43.15 1.49 
        Post 22.92 1.64 
 
20.23 16.73 23.73 
 
1.50 1.24 1.76 
Follow Up 20.96 1.59   22.19 18.67 25.71   1.65 1.38 1.91 
 
Note. Est = Estimated change from pre-to post-treatment, or pre-treatment to follow up. CI = 
Confidence interval. Pre-treatment SDs used to compute the standardized mean changes were 10.24 
(IUS-12), 6.55 (PANAS), 6.36 (RTQ), 10.49 (SIAS), and 13.48 (SPS).  P-values for all changes in 
outcome during treatment were < .001. IUS-12 = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale-12, PANAS = 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale, RTQ = Repetitive Thinking Questionnaire, SIAS = Social 
Interaction Anxiety Scale, SPS = Social Phobia Scale. 
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Table 4. 
Mood Management Group Outcomes 
Measure 
and Time 
      
Mean Change from 
Pre-Treatment   
Standardized 
Mean Change 
M SE   Est 95% CI   d 95% CI 
IUS-12 
          Pre 38.58 1.04 
        Post 34.93 1.21 
 
3.64 1.64 5.65 
 
.34 .15 .52 
Follow Up 35.45 1.36 
 
3.13 0.95 5.31 
 
.29 .09 .49 
           PANAS 
          Pre 29.56 0.84 
        Post 24.42 0.98 
 
5.14 3.15 7.14 
 
.61 .37 .84 
Follow Up 23.04 1.05 
 
6.52 4.41 8.62 
 
.77 .52 1.02 
           RTQ 
          Pre 39.93 0.74 
        Post 35.42 1.04 
 
4.51 2.72 6.30 
 
.60 .36 .84 
Follow Up 34.76 1.07 
 
5.16 3.41 6.92 
 
.69 .46 .92 
           BDI-II 
          Pre 34.33 1.06 
        Post 22.61 1.44 
 
11.73 9.20 14.26 
 
1.09 .85 1.33 
Follow Up 22.56 1.69   11.78 8.51 15.04   1.09 .79 1.40 
 
Note. Est = Estimated change from pre-to post-treatment, or pre-treatment to follow up. CI = 
Confidence interval. Pre-treatment SDs used to compute the standardized mean changes were 10.87 
(IUS-12), 8.45 (PANAS), 7.49 (RTQ), and 10.76 (BDI).  P-values for all changes in outcome during 
treatment were < .001 except for pre-treatment to follow-up change on the IUS-12 (p = .005). IUS-12 
= Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale-12, PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Scale, RTQ = 
Repetitive Thinking Questionnaire, BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II. 
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Figure 1. Mean Change Trajectories across each Treatment Program and Outcome Measure 
WRG = Worry and Rumination Group, SAG = Social Anxiety Group, MMG = Mood 
Management Group, IUS-12 = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale-12, PANAS = Positive and 
Negative Affect Scale, RTQ = Repetitive Thinking Questionnaire. The bottom row contains 
trajectories for the symptom measures, which differed by group (Penn State worry 
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Questionnaire for WRG, Social Interaction Anxiety Scale for SAG, Beck Depression 
Inventory-II for MMG). Each measure uses a different scale, so they were rescaled to 
facilitate plotting. For each group, the pre-treatment symptom measure mean was rescaled to 
equal 10, and the follow-up mean score to equal 0. Rescaling the data allowed the trajectories 
to be plotted on a single axis. The rescaling only affects the numbers printed on the y-axis for 
these measures, not the shape of the trajectories. 
